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motion for summary judgment Nova did not dispute that the Commercial General 
Liability form was in fact the operative contract between the parties and controlled the 
motion (R. 270-71). 
4. The Killpack/Edmunds complaint alleged that Flagg and Able 
Construction made representations to them that they could use the house to be 
constructed by Able Construction for their psychotherapy business, when in fact 
restrictive covenants running with the property precluded such use. This underlying 
complaint sets out causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied warranty (R. 30-38). Each 
cause of action in the Killpack/Edmunds complaint is premised on the representation 
that they could run their business from the house Able built for them (Id.). The defense 
of the complaint was tendered to Nova, which accepted with a reservation of rights. 
5. The policy of insurance was originally insured with an effective period 
from May 1, 1992 to May 1, 1993. It was renewed for a period of one year to May 1, 
1994 (R. 212). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The material facts are undisputed. Nova's duties to Able are determined by the 
complaint in the underlying action and the insurance policy, both of which were before 
the trial court. The trial court did not purport to construe a written contract between 
Killpack/Edmunds and Able. 
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Nova based on its 
conclusion that an exclusion in the policy precluded coverage for claims assumed under 
a contract. This conclusion was correct. In addition Nova presented several other 
grounds on which the trial court could have ruled, most of which were explicitly 
rejected by the trial court. Nevertheless Nova will present these arguments in logical 
3 
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order and reserve its argument in support of the trial court's conclusion that the 
contractual exclusion precluded coverage for its logical place. 
The underlying complaint does not allege an occurrence resulting in property 
damage. The policy insures only against bodily injury or property damage arising from 
an "occurrence" and "occurrence" is defined as an accident by the policy. An accident 
is never present when a deliberate act is performed unless the consequences of the act 
are unexpected and unforeseen. In particular, a representation made with the purpose of 
inducing reliance cannot be an accident. Misrepresentations made in connection with 
the sale of property are not "occurrences." 
The underlying complaint did not allege property damage as required by the CGL 
policy which is a loss of tangible property whether or not it is physically damaged. The 
claim did not arise within the policy period because under an occurrence type policy the 
time of occurrence is the time when the claimant sustains actual damage not the time 
when the acts or omissions which causes such damage were committed. 
Moreover, the coverage is excluded by numerous exclusions in the policy 
including exclusions for liability assumed under a contract, which the trial court found 
applicable, exclusions for products/completed work hazards, and the impaired property 
exclusion. All arguments based on exclusions require attention to their specific 
language and cannot be summarized briefly. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT NOVA 
HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND ABLE UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY AS 
APPLIED TO THE COMPLAINT IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION. 
A. No Issues of Material Facts Existed in the Trial Court because Nova's 
Duties to Able are Determined by the Complaint in the Underlying Action and the 
Insurance Policy. 
In its brief on appeal Able contends that its written contract with Killpack and 
Edmunds should have been before the district court and that the district court could not 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court correctly enter summary judgment for 
plaintiff/appellee Nova Casualty Company ("Nova"), pursuant to its ruling that Nova 
had no duty under the Commercial General Liability Insurance ("CGL") policy to defend 
Able Construction, Inc. and John C. Flagg 1 against the complaint brought against them 
by Ruth M. Killpack and Rita Edmunds? 
2. Did the district court correctly determine an exclusion in the CGL Policy 
excluding coverage for obligations assumed under a contract excluded coverage of the 
lawsuit brought against Able? 
3. Do other provisions of the CGL policy, which the district court determined 
did not preclude coverage, in fact support the district court's conclusion that the policy 
does not require Nova to defend against the underlying lawsuit? 
All of these issues are governed by Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(summary judgment). Entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law and this 
court gives no deference to the trial court's determination. Sanderson v. First Security 
Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992). On appeal the reviewing court applies 
the same standard applied by the trial court. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff/Appellee Nova Casualty Company ("Nova") brought this declaratory 
judgment action to determine whether it had a duty to defend defendant/appellants Able 
construction and John D. Flagg against the complaint filed against them by Ruth M. 
1
 Appellees Able Construction, Inc and John C Flagg will generally be referred to collectively as "Able " Their 
interests in this action are identical 
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Killpack and Rita Edmunds (Killpack/Edmunds complaint). In that complaint, Killpack 
and Edmunds alleged that as part of a construction contract entered into between them 
and Able, defendant Flagg made representations that they could use the house that Able 
was to construct for them for their psychotherapy business, when in fact restrictive 
covenants running with the property precluded such use (Killpack/Edmunds complaint, 
R. 35-38). The complaint set forth causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied warranty (R. 
227-246). Nova had issued to Able Construction a CGL policy. Upon Abie's tender of 
the defense of the Killpack/Edmunds complaint Nova undertook the defense pursuant 
to a reservation of rights (R. 194-196). 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Court 
Able filed an answer and counterclaim (R. 54). Defendants Killpack and 
Edmunds filed an appearance (R. 163) and answered (R. 161) but did not participate in 
any of the proceedings in the court below, Plaintiff Nova brought a motion for summary 
judgment (R. 166) to which Able responded (R. 262). After a hearing the court entered 
its memorandum decision (R. 292) and summary judgment (R. 296). 
C. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. Nova Casualty is a New York Corporation authorized and licensed to 
write insurance in the State of Utah. (R. 213) 
2. Able Construction is a Utah Corporation with its principal place of 
business in Utah County, Utah, and John C. Flagg is an officer of Able and a resident of 
Utah County, Utah. (R. 213) 
3. Nova issued a policy of insurance to Able . The policy attached to its 
complaint for declaratory relief was entitled "Contractors Special Policy" (R. 1-28). 
However, in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Able 
contended that the governing policy was one entitled "Commercial General Liability 
Policy" which they attached to their memorandum (R. 227-246). For purposes of the 
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motion for summary judgment Nova did not dispute that the Commercial General 
Liability form was in fact the operative contract between the parties and controlled the 
motion (R. 270-71). 
4. The Killpack/Edmunds complaint alleged that Flagg and Able 
Construction made representations to them that they could use the house to be 
constructed by Able construction for their psychotherapy business, when in fact 
restrictive covenants running with the property precluded such use. This underlying 
complaint sets out causes of action for breach of contract, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, and breach of implied warranty (R. 30-38). Each 
cause of action in the Killpack/Edmunds complaint is premised on each cause of action 
in the Killpack/Edmunds reliance on the representation that hey could run their business 
from the house Able built for them (Id.). The defense of the complaint was tendered to 
Nova, which accepted with a reservation of rights. 
5. The policy of insurance was originally insured with an effective period 
from May 1, 1992 to May 1, 1993. It was renewed for a period of one year to May 1, 
1994 (R. 212). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The material facts are undisputed. Nova's duties to Able are determined by the 
complaint in the underlying action and the insurance policy, both of which were before 
the trial court. The trial court did not purport to construe a written contract between 
Killpack/Edmunds and Able. 
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Nova based on its 
conclusion that an exclusion in the policy precluded coverage for claims assumed under 
a contract. This conclusion was correct. In addition Nova presented several other 
grounds on which the trial court could have ruled, most of which were explicitly 
rejected by the trial court. Nevertheless Nova will present these arguments in logical 
3 
order and reserve its argument in support of the trial court's conclusion that the 
contractual exclusion precluded coverage for its logical place. 
The underlying complaint does not allege an occurrence resulting in property 
damage. The policy insures only against bodily injury or property damage arising from 
an "occurrence" and "occurrence" is defined as an accident by the policy. An accident 
is never present when a deliberate act is performed unless the consequences of the act 
are unexpected and unforeseen. In particular, a representation made with the purpose of 
inducing reliance cannot be an accident. Misrepresentations made in connection with 
the sale of property are not "occurrences." 
The underlying complaint did not allege property damage as required by the CGL 
policy which is a loss of tangible property whether or not it is physically damaged. The 
claim did not arise within the policy period. Because under an occurrence type policy 
the time of occurrence is the time when the claimant sustains actual damage not the time 
when the acts or omissions which causes such damage were committed. 
Moreover, the coverage is excluded by numerous exclusions in the policy 
including exclusions for liability assumed under a contract, which the trial court found 
applicable, exclusions for products/completed work hazards, and the impaired property 
exclusion. All argument based exclusions require attention to their specific language 
and cannot be summarized briefly. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT CONCLUDED CORRECTLY THAT NOVA 
HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND ABLE UNDER THE INSURANCE POLICY AS 
APPLIED TO THE COMPLAINT IN THE UNDERLYING ACTION. 
A. No Issues of Material Facts Existed in the Trial Court because Nova's 
Duties to Able are Determined by the Complaint in the Underlying Action and the 
Insurance Policy. 
In its brief on appeal Able contends that its written contract with Killpack and 
Edmunds should have been before the district court and that the district court could not 
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have concluded that the contractual liability exclusion precluded the claim without 
examining that contract. This is incorrect. In a declaratory judgment action to determine 
whether the insurance policy requires that the insurer defend the insured, this court has 
stated: 
We have previously held that an insurer's duty to defend is broader 
that its duty to indemnify. Its defense duty arises when the insurer 
ascertains facts giving rise to potential liability under the insurance 
policy. Deseret Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc, v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986). This 
potential liability is determined by referring to the allegations in the 
underlying complaint. When those allegations, if proved, could 
result in liability under the policy, then the insurer has a duty to 
defend. Id. at 1147. 
Sharon Steel v. Aetna Cas. and Sur.f 931 P.2d 127, 133 (Utah 1997). See also First 
Wyoming Bank v. Continental Ins., 860 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Wyo. 1993) ("We analyze 
the duty to defend by examining the facts alleged in the complaint that the claim is 
based upon.") 
The underlying complaint in this action was before the district court (R. 30-38). 
Although it alleges a written "contractual agreement" between Killpack and Edmunds 
on the one hand and Able Construction and John Flagg on the other (R. 36-38) the 
representation upon which the complaint is based is found in paragraph 10: 
"Defendants [Able and Flagg] represented to plaintiffs [Killpack and Edmunds] that as 
developer of the subdivision and drafter of the restrictive covenants, that there would be 
no restriction against the operation of the psychotherapy business by the plaintiffs from 
their home and defendants agreed to build a home for plaintiffs which would specifically 
provide facilities for a psychotherapy business." (R. 37). All of Killpack/Edmunds 
claims are based on this allegedly false representation. 
Paragraph 11 of the underlying complaint alleges that "The parties then 
negotiated in 1993 a construction contract for the building of such home." (R. 37). If 
anything in the written construction agreement would have been probative of the 
coverage issue in the trial court, Able, a party to the contract, could easily have 
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presented it by way of affidavit. A party opposing summary judgment is obliged to 
bring forth such evidence as is in its possession that raises an issue of material fact. 
Franklin Financial v. New Empire Development Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) 
Able failed to do this in the district court and should not be heard now to complain that 
evidence obviously in its possession might possibly change the result if the district court 
had seen it. Nothing in the underlying complaint itself indicates that the written 
construction contract was probative of any issue below. 
IL The Underlying Complaint Alleged No "Occurrence" which would Trigger 
Insurance Coverage under the Commercial General Liability Policy. 
The district court rested its summary judgment in favor of Nova exclusively on 
the policy exclusion regarding obligations assumed under a contract (R. 243). 
Although, of course, Nova agrees with this conclusion, it argued numerous other 
provisions of the policy which the trial court rejected. Nevertheless, Nova wishes to 
argue them in what it believes is a logical sequence and will take up the arguments in 
support of the contractual obligation exclusion below. On the appeal of a summary 
judgment, this court can affirm on any grounds which support the trial court's ruling 
even if the trial court did not rely on those grounds. K&T Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 
623, 628 (Utah, 1995). 
The underlying complaint does not allege an "occurrence" which, as defined by 
the policy, is a necessary to trigger coverage. The exact words of the CGL policy, 
omitting parts not relevant, are as follows: 
SECTION I - COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A. BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY 
DAMAGE LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement. 
a. We [Nova] will pay those sums that the insured becomes 
legally obligated to pay as damages because of "bodily 
injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance 
applies. We will have the right and duty to defend any 
"suit" seeking those damages. We may at our discretion 
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investigate any "occurrence" and settle any claim or "suit" 
that may result. . . . 
b. This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "property 
damage" only if: 
(1) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" is caused 
by an "occurrence" that takes place in the "coverage 
territory;" . . . 
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs 
during the policy period. 
CGL Policy, p.l (R. 243). Occurrence is defined in definition 9 at page 11 of the policy 
(R. 233) as follows: "'Occurrence' means an accident, including continuous or repeated 
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions." Nothing in the 
Killpack/Edmunds complaint alleges an accident. 
The gravamen of the underlying complaint is that Able wrongfully represented 
that no restrictive covenant would prevent Killpack/Edmunds from operating their 
therapy business out of the house that Able built for them. Each cause of action in the 
complaint is premised on this alleged erroneous or wrongful representation. This 
representation cannot be construed to be an accident. 
Although Nova could find no case in which this court considered the meaning of 
"accident" as used in an insurance policy, the Utah Court of Appeals has had the issue 
presented in two cases involving bodily injury: Fire Ins. Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 
P.2d 1202 (Utah App. 1997) and State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952 
(Utah App. 1994). Both Geary, 869 P.2d at 955 and Fire Insurance, 930 P.2d at 1205, 
quote in italics the following words from Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Dotts, 685 P.2d 632, 
633-634 (Wash. App. 1984): 
[T]o recover under a policy insuring against death or injury by 
accidental means, (1) it is not enough that the result was unusual, 
unexpected, or unforeseen, but it must appear that the means was 
accidental; and (2) accident is never present when a deliberate act 
is performed, unless some additional unexpected, independent, 
and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings 
about the result of injury or death. 
1 
Both Geary and Fire Insurance emphasize that if the act causing the harm is intentional, 
it does matter that the harm itself was unintended. 
Here, all of Killpack/Edmunds' damages flow from the alleged representation that 
the business use of the house was not restricted. This representation was clearly an 
intended, purposeful act. It may have been erroneous but errors of this sort are not 
"accidents." In fact, unlike the more or less unpredictable consequences of throwing a 
cherry bomb or the somewhat random pattern of shotgun pellets that were under 
consideration in Geary and Fire Insurance, the probable consequences of representing 
that there were no restrictions on business operations out of the house were entirely 
foreseeable. If the representation were accurate, the business would proceed 
unhindered. If the representation were inaccurate, it is entirely foreseeable and 
predictable that the neighbors in the subdivision would bring action to close it down. 
Perhaps Mr. Flagg hoped that this would not be the consequence, perhaps he made the 
representation believing or not knowing whether or not it was true. But it was still 
intentional. This representation was every bit as intentional as throwing a cherry bomb 
or firing a shot gun and the likely results were much more predictable. His statement 
cannot be construed as an accident. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court had a similar situation before it in First Wyoming 
Bank v. Continental Ins., 869 P.2d 1094 (Wyo. 1993). It had reversed a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment and remanded for a determination of the insurer's duty to 
defend, but on re-hearing, changed its opinion and affirmed the summary judgment. The 
court stated that the plaintiffs complaints alleged that the "Bank misrepresented its 
position concerning loans and their banking relationship with the [plaintiffs] Robinsons 
and Russells." 860 P.2d at 1100. It reasoned that to recover on this theory the plaintiffs 
would have to show that the misrepresentations were made for the purpose of inducing 
reliance from the plaintiffs. Id. The court then said, 
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The intent to induce reliance would make the 
misrepresentations and conduct not accidental. [Dykstra v. 
Foremost Ins. Co. 14 Cal. App. 4th 361, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 
545 (1993)] The CGL policy covers loss caused by an 
"occurrence" only and defines "occurrence" as an 
"accident." Thus, if a misrepresentation is non-accidental, 
then it is not an occurrence an cannot [be] covered by the 
CGL policy. 
To prevail in the underlying case Killpack and Edmunds must show that Abie's 
representation was made to induce them to rely on it and enter the construction 
contract. If it were merely an idle, meaningless statement as the district court seems to 
believe it could have been (Memo. Dec f 22, R. 285), then Killpack/Edmunds could not 
possibly prevail. 
In M.L. Foss, Inc., v. Liberty Mutual Ins., Co., 885 P.2d 284, 285 (Colo. App. 
1994) the court said: 
While neither party has cited any Colorado law directly on point, 
the general rule clearly appears to be that alleged misrepresentations 
made in connection with the sale of property does not constitute an 
'occurrence' as that term is uniformly defined in comprehensive 
general liability policies. See Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. 
Andrews 915 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1990); American States Insurance 
Co. v. Canyon Creek, 786 F.Supp. 821 (N.D. Calif. 1991); 
Cunningham & Walsh, Inc. v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., [88 
Or. App. 251], 744 P.2d 1317 (Or. App. 1987); R.A. Earnhardt, Etc. 
v. South Carolina Ins. [277 S.C. 88], 282 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 1981) . . 
. . Plaintiff has cited no authority to the contrary. Accordingly, the 
court concludes that the underlying complaint does not allege facts 
that even arguably might constitute an 'occurrence' within the 
meaning of the liability policy. 
Although in its Brief of Appellants, Able has chosen not to go beyond the contractual 
obligation ground on which the summary judgment was entered, in the district court 
Able cited no cases that holding that a misrepresentation in connection with the sale of 
property constituted an occurrence under an insurance policy. 
Nova could find no opinions in which this court has construed the meaning of 
accident as it relates to an "occurrence" in a CGL policy. However, in construing Sec. 
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34A-2-401 Utah Code Annotated relating to compensation for industrial accidents, this 
court has emphasized that an accident is "unanticipated, unplanned and unintended," 
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 21-22 ( Utah 1986). This definition is not 
substantially different from the court of appeals' construction of the term as found in 
insurance policies. Mr. Flagg's statement was planned, and, as discussed above, the 
consequences could have been expected by any reasonable person. See also Hilton 
Hotel v. Industrial Comn of Utah, 897 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995). 
C. The Underlying Complaint does not Allege Property Damage and therefore 
is not Covered Under the Insuring Agreement. 
The policy covers only an occurrence that causes bodily injury or property 
damage (R. 243). Property damage in turn is defined to mean: 
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting 
loss of use of that property. All such loss of use shall be 
deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that 
caused it; or 
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically 
injured. All such loss shall be deemed to occur at the time of 
the" occurrence" that caused it. 
(R. 231). 
Quite clearly the closing of the home therapy business does not constitute 
physical injury to tangible personal property. The underlying complaint does not allege 
that Killpack and Edmunds have lost the use of their house as a residence or been 
ousted from it. Rather they have lost the business use of the house which a court 
determined to be illegal. Killpack and Edmunds do not claim that the house is now 
useless to them; rather they seen "monetary damages for loss of business and 
profitability and for costs of relocation of their business and increased costs of doing 
business" (R. 31). Such damages do not constitute physical injury. Milgard 
Manufacturing v. Continental Ins, 759 P.2d 1111, 1112 (Or. App. 1988). 
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In M.L. Foss v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 855 P.2d 284, 286 (Col. App., 1994) the 
court quoted with approval this conclusion from the trial court: 
Thus, the alleged damages did not constitute 'property damage' as defined 
by the liability policy. That is, it did not allege 'physical injury to or 
destruction of tangible property . . . .' Rather, economic losses resulting 
from the alleged nondisclosure of material facts in connection with the 
sale. Purely economic losses do not constitute 'property damage' within 
the meaning of the liability policy. See Lamar Truck Plaza, Inc. v. Sentry 
Ins., 757 P.2d 1143 (Col. App. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 143 
F.Supp. 723 (N.D. Calif. 1990); American States Ins. Co., supra; Safeco 
Ins. Co. of America, supra. Accordingly, because the underlying 
complaint did not allege 'property damage' there was neither a duty to 
defend not coverage under the liability policy. 
The Killpack/Edmunds complaint as well alleges only economic damages. 
D. The Claims Stated in the Underlying Complaint Did not Arise Within the 
Policy. 
The Nova Policy was in effect from May 1, 1992 to May 1, 1994 (R. 212). 
Paragraph 14 of the underlying complaint states that on October 4, 1994, five months 
after the expiration of the policy Killpack/Edmunds received notice from the 
architectural committee that their house could not be used to operate their business (R. 
36). Although the dates are not specified in the complaint the committee is alleged to 
have followed up with legal action when the plaintiffs refused to close their home office 
voluntarily (Id). Assuming that there is tortious conduct that might otherwise be 
covered, it is clear that damages did not occur until after the policy. Until damages are 
incurred there is no occurrence covered by the policy. 
An occurrence policy provides coverage if the event insured against takes place 
in the policy period irrespective of when the claim is presented. See, Annotation, 
Insurance -- Time of Event, 37 A.L.R. 4th 382, 390; Ranger Ins. Co. v. United States 
Fire Ins. Co., 350 So.2d. (Fla. App. 1977). 
In a great many cases involving policies of the "occurrence" type 
courts have expressly stated that the general rule that the time of an 
"occurrence' under such a policy is the time when the claimant 
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sustains actual damage, and not the time when the acts or omissions 
caused which caused such damage was committed. 
34 A.L.R. 4th at 390. Emphasis added. 
E. The District Court Properly Applied the Contractual Liability Exclusion to 
the Underlying Complaint. 
In its memorandum opinion the district court stated: 
Finally, this court finds that the contract liability exclusion 
(exclusion b) bars coverage under the policy for '"property 
damage' for which the insured is obligated to pay damages by 
reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement" 
(Id. at 2(b)) (emphasis added). The exceptions to this exclusion do 
not apply because the "contract or agreement" is not an "insured 
contract" as that the term is defined in the policy nor is the liability 
such "[t]hat the insured would have in the absence of the contract 
agreement" with the Killpack/Edmunds defendants. (Id.) Based 
upon this exclusion, Nova is not under an obligation to defend or 
indemnify Able for the claims in the underlying complaint on any 
one of the causes of actions alleged therein. 
(R. 282). 
The trial court ruled correctly with respect to this exclusion. In TGA 
Development, Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co. of New York 62 F.3d 1089 (8th Cir. 1995) the 
court interpreted the standard CGL contract exclusion, which is identical to the 
exclusion here, to bar a claim very similar to the Killpack/Edmunds claim here. TGA was 
sued by a law firm for which it had built an office when the firms' computers did not 
work because of excessive electromagnetic fields generated by the electrical system 
designed by TGA. The trial court entered summary judgment for the insurance 
company premised, among other reasons, on the exclusion of coverage for damages for 
which the insured had assumed liability in a contract or agreement. The court states at 
1091-92: 
TGA also asserts that the exclusion bars coverage only when 
the insured has expressly agreed by contract "to save harmless or 
indemnify" a third party. . . . We think that the language plainly 
excludes coverage for contractual claims made for TGA's failure to 
provide Gribble & Sayre with a condominium unit free from defects 
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Therefore, even if the presence of EMF resulted in personal 
injury as defined in the Employers policy, the contractual liability 
exclusion nonetheless precludes coverage. 
In First Wyoming Bank v. Continental Ins. 860 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Wyoming 
1993) (also discussed above with respect to meaning of "occurrence"), the Wyoming 
Supreme Court found that "Although there is a claim in the complaints labeled 
'NEGLIGENCE,' the facts of the complaint. . . demonstrate alleged losses resulting from 
a breach of contract." The court noted that it had "previously held that comprehensive 
general liability policies cover tortious acts but do not cover claims for breach of 
contract." Id, It quoted Action Ads, Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co., 685 P.2d 42 
(Wyoming 1984) as follows: "We conclude that the coverage clause at issue in the 
present case encompasses liability which the law imposes on all insureds for their 
tortious conduct and not on the liability which a particular insured may choose to 
assume pursuant to a contract." Id. 
Here the underlying complaint alleges that Able would build them a house with a 
room from which they could conduct their psychotherapy business. This is clearly an 
agreement and a contract. If that agreement is breached Able is obligated for 
contractual damages. There is no tort and therefore the CGL policy does not apply. 
Abie's attack on the trial court's conclusion that coverage was precluded by the 
contractual liability exclusion at page 23 through 24 of their brief, arguing that the 
absence of the written agreement precludes summary judgment under the contractual 
liability exclusion. They nowhere refer to Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc, v. United 
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143 (Utah 1986) nor Sharon Steele v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety, 931 P.2d 127 (Utah 1997) in which the rule is stated that to 
determine whether an insurance company has the duty to defend against a complaint, 
the court must analyze the complaint itself and the policy in question to determine 
whether the complaint states any claim which if proved, would require the company to 
indemnify the insured. Nothing in the underlying complaint implies that anything in the 
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written contract would change the results of the trial court's summary judgment. If the 
written contract were probative of any issue in this declaratory judgment action, Able 
and Killpack had every opportunity to bring it before the trial court. A party opposing 
summary judgment should not be heard to say that evidence completely within its 
knowledge and control was not before the trial court and argue hypothetically as Able 
does throughout its brief that if the evidence had been presented the result below might 
be different. Similarly Able argues that "for summary judgment on this issue [of the 
contractual liability exclusion] to be proper, Nova must have first presented evidence 
showing the requisite assumption of liability." Again this ignores the strictures of 
Deseret Federal and Sharon Steele. For the plaintiffs in the underlying complaint to 
prevail they must prove the assumption of such liability. The test is not whether in fact 
Killpack and Edmunds prove that the contractual obligation existed, but whether they 
have properly plead facts which if proved would establish that it did. It makes no sense 
to state that Nova must now present "evidence" to support the underlying plaintiffs 
case before its exclusion applies. 
£. Coverage of the Killpack/Edmunds Complaint is Precluded by the 
Products/Completed Work Hazard Exclusion. 
Exclusion 1 of the policy provides that it does not cover: 
L "Property damage" to "your work" arising out of it or any 
part of it and included in the "products-completed 
operations hazard." 
This exclusion does not apply if the damaged work or the 
work out of which the damage arises was performed on your 
behalf by a subcontractor. (R. 211) 
The "products-completed operations hazard" is defined as follows: 
li.a. "Products-completed operations hazard" includes all 
"bodily injury" and "property damage" occurring away 
from the premises you own or rent and arising out of "your 
product" or "your work" except: 
(1) Products that are still in your physical possession, or 
14 
(2) Work that has not yet been completed or abandoned 
b. "Your work" will be deemed completed at the earliest of the 
following times: 
(1) When all of the work called for in your contract has 
been completed. 
(2) When all of the work to be done at the site has been 
completed if your contract calls for work at more than 
one site. 
(3) When the part of the work done at a job site has been 
put to its intended use by any person or organization 
other that another contractor or subcontractor 
working on the same project. 
Work that may need service, maintenance, correction, repair 
or replacement, but which is otherwise complete, will be 
treated as completed. 
And Finally "your work" is defined to mean: 
15. "Your work" means: 
a. Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf; and 
b. Materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with 
such work or operations. 
"Your work" includes: 
a. Warranties or representations made at any time with respect 
to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of "your 
work;" and 
b. The providing of or failure to provide warnings or 
instructions. 
(R. 233 and 232) 
Killpack/Edmunds allege in their complaint that they moved into the property and 
began doing business from it. The only possible property damage in question, the loss of 
use of the residential office, clearly applies to work performed by Able and is caused by 
deficiencies in its work. In fact, the last part of subsection b of this exclusion states, 
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"work which requires further service, maintenance, correction, repair or replacement, but 
which is otherwise complete will be treated as completed." Clearly if any property 
damage exists, this exclusion precludes coverage. 
Similarly the definition of "your work" which includes work or operations 
performed by Able and/or warranties or representations made by Able at any time with 
respect to the fitness, quality, durability, performance or use of your work is exactly 
applicable to facts of this case. It is interesting that in the court below, Able nowhere 
made any rebuttal to Nova's claim that this products-completed work hazard exclusion 
established that the policy did not apply to the Killpack/Edmunds complaint. 
G. The Impaired Property Exclusion Applies to the Killpack/ Edmunds Claim. 
Exclusion m (R. 211) provides that the policy does not apply to 
"Property damage" to "impaired property" or property that 
has not been physically injured arising out of: 
(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous 
condition in "your product" or "your work" or 
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your 
behalf to perform a contract or agreement in 
accordance with its terms. 
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other 
property arising out of sudden and accidental physical injury 
to "your product" or "your work" after it has been put to 
its intended use. 
Like the products completed operations hazards exclusion, this exclusion applies 
precisely to the facts plead in the underlying complaint. Assuming that 
Killpack/Edmunds inability to use the house for their psychotherapy business is 
property damage to "impaired property" or property that has not been physically 
injured, it clearly arises out of the defect in Abie's work. Able did not perform the 
contract or representation as he said he would (i.e.. he did not deliver a home from 
which a psychotherapy business could be conducted) or more precisely failed to 
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perform a contract or agreement in accordance with its terms. Again, no where in the 
records has Able controverted the effect of this exclusion 
IL THE RECORD BELOW IS COMPLETELY DEVOID OF ANY 
EVIDENCE OF A "ADVERTISING INJURY" 
In its brief on appeal Able makes the surprising argument that summary judgment 
must be reversed because Killpack/Edmunds suffered an advertising injury which is 
covered by the policy (Brief of Appellants at 27-29). This argument was mentioned for 
the first time in the trial court at the hearing on Nova's motion for summary judgment; it 
does not appear in Abie's opposition memorandum in district court (R. 262). There are 
numerous problems with this assertion. Nothing in the underlying complaint looks like 
an advertisement, an advertising injury, nor an invasion of the right of privacy. If it did, 
it would clearly be excluded by the policy. 
JA The Applicable Provisions of the Policy Show That there is no Advertising 
injury Alleged in the Underlying Complaint. 
These policy provisions relate to Abie's "advertising injury" arguments: 
COVERAGE B. PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY 
LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement. 
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages because of "personal injury" or 
"advertising injury" to which this coverage part applies. We 
will have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking 
those damages... . 
b. This insurance applies to 
(2) "Advertising injury" caused by an offense committed 
in the course of advertising your goods, products or 
services; 
but only if the offense was committed in the "coverage 
territory" during the policy period. (R.240) 
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"Advertising injury" is defined as: 
1. "Advertising injury" means injury arising out of one or more 
of the following offenses: 
a. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or 
libels a person or organization or disparages a person's or 
organization's goods, products or services; 
b. Oral or written publication of material that violates a 
person's right of privacy. 
c. Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing 
business; or 
d. Infringement of copyright, title or slogan. (R. 235) 
The exceptions to an "advertising injury" are as follows: 
2. Exclusions. 
This insurance does not apply to: 
b. "Advertising injury" arising out of: 
(1) Breach of contract, other than misappropriation 
of advertising ideas under an implied contract. 
(2) The failure of goods, products or services to 
conform with advertised quality or 
performance. 
Nothing in the underlying complaint indicates that Killpack/Edmunds suffered an 
offense committed by Able in the course of advertising its goods, products or services. 
Even if Able had been advertising, no injury is alleged in the underlying 
complaint that comes close to the definition of an "advertising injury". No offense is 
alleged in the Killpack/Edmunds complaint. In Novell Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 
983 (Tenth Cir. 1998) the court, construing Utah law, said, "In analyzing whether Ross' 
complaint triggered a duty on the part of the defendant to defend, we examine whether 
Ross' complaint alleged the predicate offense, i.e., one of the offenses specifically listed 
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in the definition of 'advertising injury.' " Able suggests that the predicate offense is the 
invasion of privacy. Invasion of privacy is discussed at length in Stien v. Marriott 
Ownership Resorts, Inc., 944 P.2d 374(Utah App.1997). The Court of Appeals notes 
that the offense may consist of four possible offenses which it identifies as (1) Intrusion 
upon Seclusion (2) Appropriation of Name or Likeness (3) Publicity given to Private 
Facts (4) False Light. From the facts alleged in the underlying complaint it is impossible 
to see how Ms. Killpack and Edmunds could have alleged any of these various forms of 
invasion of privacy. They certainly do not allege one of them. Finally, coverage would 
clearly be excluded by the fact that the injury arises from a breach of contract or failure 
of products or services to conform with quality or performance promised. 
For these reasons Abie's argument that the underlying complaint may have 
alleged an invasion of privacy is totally without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly entered summary judgment for Nova in the declaratory 
judgment action. The exclusion relating to liability assumed under a contract clearly 
precludes coverage of the underlying complaint. In addition, various aspects of the 
insuring agreement, including the lack of an occurrence, the occurrence outside the 
period of the policy, and that no property damage is alleged in the underlying complaint 
also preclude coverage. The district court could have entered summary judgment on 
these grounds. In addition, other exclusions including the product-completed work 
hazard exclusion and the impaired property exclusion exclude coverage of the 
Killpack/Edmunds claim. For these reasons the summary judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of September, 1998 
J.kAMXHIRSCHI 
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